Scientific discovery requires both abstract, theoretically in stimulating critical debate and eventually establishing a scientifically optimal operation. In practice, theoretical defined concepts and discovery operations formed by and philosophical tests are often combined to test comsets of rules that permit the empirical detection of peting discovery operations as rigorously as possible. instances of those concepts. In this paper, I examine the 
INTRODUCTION
(universal, predictive) and ideographic (historical, retrodictive) discovery operations, and between complementary and exclusive discovery operations. Three types of tests of discovery operations are commonly employed Evolutionary biologists are obsessed with discovery in evolutionary biology. Theoretical tests aim to show operations. Consistently, the most critical debates are that a discovery operation is inconsistent with accepted, not about biological inferences themselves, but rather well-corroborated, empirical theories. Empirical tests the methods used to make those inferences. This has evaluate the performance of competing discovery operabeen especially evident over the past few decades, durtions in terms of their results when applied to the same ing which time countless pages of journals and books empirical data sets. Philosophical tests aim to show that have been dedicated to the attack, defense, and counan operation is inconsistent with logical and epistemologterattack of competing discovery operations. Debates ical principles. Appropriately designed theoretical and are ongoing in virtually every arena of evolutionary philosophical tests of ideographic discovery operations biology, from general methods of phylogenetic infermay be scientifically valid. Empirical tests, however, are ence, biogeography, species definition and individuaincapable of evaluating the scientific merits of competing tion, and studies of adaptation, to the particular details discovery operations. Nonetheless, empirical compariof research programs, such as character weighting and sons (not tests) of competing discovery operations may polarization, use of polymorphic, multistate, and conprovide insight into the ways discovery operations may tinuous characters, sequence alignment, and data partitioning in systematics. be misleading and therefore may play an important role Despite the preoccupation with discovery operations Carroll, 1895), they have paid relatively little attention to them. With only a few noteworthy exceptions (e.g., in evolutionary biology, few efforts have been made to examine the strategies employed to test them and Nagel, 1979; 3 Carnap, 1966) , when they have addressed discovery operations, it is usually in the context of the fewer still to specify exactly what discovery operations are and how they serve scientists in constructing and failed program of operationalism (e.g., Bridgman, 1927; Frank, 1956; Popper, 1959 Popper, , 1983a Popper, , 1989 Boyd, 1991 ; see testing evolutionary hypotheses. The objectives of this paper are therefore twofold. In the first section I explore below). They tend to focus instead on theories, laws, models, 4 and hypotheses (terms which may or may and clarify the nature of discovery operations in science in general and evolutionary biology-a fundanot be synonymous, depending on the philosopher) and their relation to reality. Their efforts have engenmentally historical science 1 -in particular. In the second section I examine the types of tests evolutionary dered a rich literature on the nature of these classes of propositions, the tests that evaluate them, and their biologists employ to choose among discovery operations, and I summarize and evaluate a few published role as both cause and effect in society. At first glance, it may appear that discovery operations are not distinct examples of each type of test. Examples were chosen to illustrate the strengths and limitations of each type from these classes of propositions or perhaps that they are somehow conceptually subsumed by them. Howof test, as well as the sorts of errors that may occur. It should be noted that my aim here is only to examine ever, a clear distinction can be identified: Theories, laws, models, and hypotheses are empirical-that is, the tests of discovery operations, not the discovery operations per se. The actual testing of discovery operathey aim to describe and/or explain directly some aspect of the natural world (or at least our perceptions tions involves the consideration of many more aspects in much more detail than I cover here, and my discusof it, as subjectivist epistemologies assert)-whereas discovery operations do not make any empirical assersion of a particular test should not be taken as either an endorsement or a criticism of any of the discovery tions whatsoever. Instead, discovery operations are the sets of decision rules (inference rules, 5 correspondence operations concerned. The first section of the paper deals with philosophical issues necessary to establish rules, interpretation rules, axiom systems) used to generate and choose among competing empirical claims. the foundations for the second section, but some readers may prefer to begin with the second, more applied section.
that aim to generate and test scientific hypotheses. The evaluation of empirical methods, such as those employed to extract DNA or change a flat tire, is much more straightforward and is not the subject of this paper.
THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF
3 As expressed here (Nagel, 1979, pp. 79-105 ), Nagel's correspon-
DISCOVERY OPERATIONS AND THEIR ROLE
dence rules match quite closely what I refer to as discovery opera-
IN SCIENCE
tions. However, this more modest interpretation differs extensively from his (e.g., Nagel, 1974) use of correspondence rules (or, in this context, bridge laws) as the centerpiece of his model of intertheoretic reduction.
Although philosophers of science have long been 4 Use of the term model is extremely ambiguous in science. It is aware of the importance of discovery operations 2 (e.g., generally used as a catchall to refer to empirically falsifiable hypotheses, metaphysical constructs, and, occasionally, discovery operations.
1
Many of the subdisciplines of evolutionary biology-including Siddall and Kluge's (1997) definition of models as based on deterministic assumptions and theories (hypotheses) as based on nondetergenetics, ecology, comparative morphology, developmental biology, and physiology-are largely predictive and deal with intensionally ministic background knowledge-although a more restrictive definition-is not entirely at odds with Weinert's (1999) interpretation defined class concepts rather than descriptive generalities. However, because all aspects of life are ultimately the result of history, all of models in terms of constraints, and it accurately characterizes the set of models Siddall and Kluge were referring to. See Weinert (1999) biological disciplines must ultimately be reconciled with and interpreted in light of historical propositions. (See also Ghiselin, 1997, for a classification and discussion of models and their uses. 5 Inference rules here must be distinguished from those of the pp. 297-300.) 2 Method is a more general term that applies to any operational instrumentalists, who interpret laws and theories not as statements that are true or false but as mere rules for inferring and predicting protocol designed to achieve a particular end. I use the more restrictive term discovery operation in reference to the subset of methods observation statements.
attachment to any single discovery method. (Frost and Kluge, Discovery operations should not be mistaken for uni-1994, p. 269) versal "methods of discovery" in the sense of rulebased, orderly, systematic procedures guaranteed to This is not to say that theory is the only ingredient return novel, true, or justified empirical knowledge, as of a rigorous scientific research program. Clearly, any were sought (and claimed) during the Enlightenment.
research program that was able to provide only theoretThey do not play a role in the "logic of justification" ical definitions would be extremely weak because scior the "logic of discovery" as defined classically, but entists would have no way of recognizing real world instead in the logic of discovery as the rational growth examples of theoretically defined phenomena. Imagine of knowledge through blind variation and selective how fruitless and unsuccessful a research program in retention via hypothesis testing. Consequently, they evolutionary biology would be if it defined a lineage are just as fallible (and corrigible) as any other aspect as "a replicator continuum composed of organisms" of knowledge. Metaphorically, they are the spectacles (Frost and Kluge, 1994, p. 293 ) but did not provide through which scientists view and interpret the world, an operation by which lineages could be detected in bringing otherwise fuzzy or invisible patterns into fonature. Biological knowledge would consist only of the cus (hopefully) or distorting their perception such that theoretical assertion that lineages exist, but, because it conforms very little or not at all with reality. Despite scientists would be unable to formulate new hypothetheir fallibility, scientists are forced to devise discovery ses and bold predictions based on the discovery of operations; without them, no empirical knowledge individual lineages, scientific understanding of the would be possible. It is only by formulating discovery world would not grow. There would be no content operations that scientists are able to link the nonobservincreasing, progressive problemshift (Lakatos, 1978) able terms of theory with the concrete materials of and the research program would die. Consequently, a observation, hence enabling them to detect instances of rigorous scientific research program requires both (1) such theoretically defined phenomena as magnetism, abstract theoretical (ontological) definitions of concepts electricity, homology, gravity, species, clades, and and (2) sets of rules (discovery operations) to enable atoms.
the empirical detection of instances (individuals, parRecognition of the importance of discovery operaticulars, events) of those concepts in nature. 6 The contions in science should not be mistaken for an endorseceptual definition answers the question "What is a ment of operationalism (ϭ operationism, cf. phenomelineage?", while the discovery operation answers the nalism), which asserts that all scientific concepts are question "What criteria allow lineages to be detected in synonymous with the operations used to measure (denature?" This theoretical-operational nexus, wherein theory precedes and is logically distinct from its respectect, discover) them (Bridgman, 1927) . Within the contive discovery operations, helps account for the relative text of biology, Frost and Kluge (1994; see also Ghiselin, autonomy of theoretical progress observed in the his1966a,b; Farris, 1967; Hull, 1968 Hull, , 1974 Griffiths, 1974;  tory of science (see also Lakatos, 1978, p. 52 ). Wiley, 1978; Frost, 2000) contrasted operational and Functionally, discovery operations are largely deditheoretical justifications of empirical knowledge and cated to defining the empirical tests to be accepted as discussed the perils of conflating discovery operations providing decisive falsifications of competing explanawith the items searched for. Insofar as discovery operatory hypotheses. Consequently, they allow the relevant tions are axiom systems, they need only be internally data to be extracted from the infinite sense-data perlogically consistent. Therefore, ceived continuously. Only those observations that conoperationalism by its nature does not allow revision and extenstitute potential falsifiers are evidentially significant sion of discovery techniques and therefore ultimately may dictate inappropriate or incomplete discovery methods (Boyd, 1991) . . . . Unlike operationalism, theoretical justification suc-6 This view is similar to that of Nagel (1979, pp. 79-105) , who ceeds as a scientific program because it requires that hypotheses characterized scientific theories as requiring (1) abstract theoretical explaining observed regularities be externally logically consisnotions, (2) concrete experimental notions (achieved through corretent and that the set of items being looked for be defined by spondence rules), and (3) a heuristic model to depict the theory in something other than the discovery method employed. That a manner that can easily be visually imagined (e.g., a branching diagram to represent a phylogeny). is, science . . . does not limit what we can know by slavish (Popper, 1959 (Popper, , 1989 or see von Wright, 1984 , for the [discovery operations]" (Sorensen, 1992, p. 72; emphasis his) . Many of these premises are empirically testaequivalent inductivist concept of range of relevance).
ble, but others are not and are therefore metaphysical. For example, in contrast to some competing discovery Hence, discovery operations incorporate metaphysical operations, cladistics infers phylogenetic relationships research programs (Popper, 1982 (Popper, , 1983a (Popper, , 1983b ; see also from genetically heritable (at least potentially; see Lakatos, 1978) , about which Popper (1983b, p. 161) grams and driving them forward.
These metaphysical ideas include not only philosophiIn establishing the testing procedures in a given cal concepts like realism or essentialism, objectivism knowledge system, discovery operations also impose or subjectivism, and indeterminism or determinism, the specific sets of simplifying assumptions or patches but also many of the concepts that have shaped biologirequired to make generalizations about the universe cal thinking, such as climax or individualistic ecology (Frost and Kluge, 1994) . They define the scale and scope (Worster, 1994) and teleological adaptationism (cf. Lipof the study, treating certain scalar hierarchies as if ton, 2000). As a science matures, new knowledge and they were specification hierarchies and individuals technology may allow initially metaphysical claims to with fuzzy limits and no defining properties as if they become empirically testable, and the desire to achieve were intensionally defined classes with sharp edges this end may drive the science forward; for example, (Frost and Kluge, 1994; Frost, 2000) , and completely genetics transformed Darwin's (1859, p. 132 ) metaignoring phenomena that occur at different levels. As a physical belief that some sort of effect of the male and consequence of these simplifying patches, all discovery female "sexual elements" is responsible for variation operations are expected to fail with some frequency in offspring into a scientific claim. However, many and under certain conditions; whatever is detected of the knowledge claims incorporated into biological through the application of discovery operations is a discovery operations are undoubtedly destined to remere proxy for the theoretically defined concepts. Howmain metaphysical. ever, this interpretation of discovery operations should It must be clarified that the fact that metaphysical not be mistaken for an instrumentalist ontology, as research programs are not empirically testable does this would conflate the modest recognition of human not imply that the knowledge claims they lead to are fallibility with the much more radical (and irrational) pseudo-or unscientific. On this point both Popper and belief that humans can never achieve empirical knowlLakatos were clear: A metaphysical research program edge of the world as it truly is. As optimistic, rational is "scientific" as long as (among other things) the realists (or revolutionary activists sensu Lakatos, 1978, hypotheses it generates are themselves empirically falp. 20), scientists have faith that cycles of proposing sifiable. Cladistics is a set of logically related discovery and critically evaluating both their theories and their operations built largely from metaphysical principles discovery operations will bring their knowledge claims (e.g., that explanatory power and severity of test must into increasing harmony with nature as it really is (albe maximized), and it is therefore almost entirely emthough they can never know where they lie on the pirically unfalsifiable; however, as has been strongly scale of verisimilitude).
argued for decades, cladistic hypotheses are highly Discovery operations are themselves derived from falsifiable (e.g., Wiley, 1975 Wiley, , 1976 Farris, 1984 ; Kluge, particular sets of accepted premises, although they are 1997). Failure to comprehend the place of metaphysical much more than simple restatements of those premises:
claims in a falsificationist framework has caused many people-philosophers and scientists alike-to turn "We infer conclusions from premises by inference rules away from Popper's views (e.g., Ruse, 1979; Rieppel, real, physical dispositions; see also Railton, 1978] . Therefore, the best a predictive scientist can do is gener-1988).
The discovery operations employed in evolutionary ate a probability distribution based on the observed frequency of occurrence of an intensionally defined biology differ from those of many fields due to the historical nature of the problems it aims to solve. Nonclass of events and specify what the most likely outcome will be. However, no objective frequency-based historical sciences are nomothetic, seeking to establish general laws for indefinitely repeatable events and probability can exist for the necessarily unique, singular events of the past (except the trivial P ϭ 1 if it processes (see Nagel, 1979, pp. 547-548 , for use and history of this terminology). Historical sciences, such occurred or P ϭ 0 if it did not), so this procedure logically has no evidential significance in ideographic as evolutionary biology, are ideographic, aiming to discover individuals and explain singular, nonrecurrent studies (e.g., Fischer, 1970, p. 118; Carpenter, 1992; Wenzel and Carpenter, 1994; Siddall and Kluge, 1997) . This historical events-the evolution of a trait, the extinction of a lineage, the occurrence of a species at a certain should be intuitively obvious, considering that daily experience shows that even very improbable (rare) location-each of which resulted from the combination of historical contingency and the sum total of the proclasses of events do occur (which is why they have P Ͼ 0). pensities acting at the moment in question (cf. Popper, 1957, p. 122; 1983b, pp. 159-160) , and each of which However, far from being hindered by their inability to employ rationally frequency-based probabilities, idis therefore necessarily unique. This is not to say that biologists are forbidden from formulating nomothetic eographic sciences have access to a larger, more diverse, and potentially more powerful arsenal of tests explanations for nonhistorical problems and then incorporating these explanations into historical hypotheto determine the relative strength of opposing explanatory hypotheses: Because the events of interest have ses as background knowledge. However, the vast majority of biological phenomena vary extensively over already occurred, ideographic sciences can search for evidence that the events happened and that evidence can time and across lineages (e.g., ecological interactions, rates of nucleotide substitution, population size, selecbe drawn from an abundance of sources. Of course, observed evidence is not infallible; multiple events tive pressures, vagility) and therefore cannot be applied as universal biological laws and incorporated may produce the same evidence, and historical erasure of evidence may occur (see Sober, 1988) . However, alinto general (i.e., applying to all life) biological discovery operations without invoking counterfactual asthough there is always a possibility that the observed evidence is erroneous, the overall frequency or probasumptions. Even such fundamental Darwinian concepts as natural selection and adaptation are not bility of error is uninformative of whether or not a particular piece of evidence actually is erroneous beuniversal (e.g., Wake, 1991; Leroi et al., 1994; but see Rosenberg, 2000 but see Rosenberg, , 2001 . The only universal biological cause it too is singular and unique. Therefore, instead of modeling the probability of error, ideographic inferconjectures are "descent, with modification," which are held to apply throughout the biological system (if not ence relies on congruence of evidence. For example, if a scientist were interested in whether or not an extratermore universally).
The ontological differences between past and future restrial bolide impacted on Earth 65 million years ago, she would not count the number of large asteroids, pose nomothetic and ideographic sciences with different obstacles to be overcome. Nomothetic sciences are comets, and other objects of appropriate size that pass through this solar system and/or the frequency of this primarily predictive, and they must therefore accommodate the objective indeterminacy of the future in class of event on this or any other planet to generate a probability distribution; such discovery operations their discovery operations: There is no way to know which number will be rolled on the next throw of a are appropriate and necessary to estimate the probability that an event of this kind may happen in the future, fair die, not because of lack of understanding, but because the outcome of any roll is truly (objectively) unbut they are irrelevant given the ideographic question at hand. Instead, the scientist would look for evidence determined [hence Popper's (1982 Popper's ( , 1983a propensity interpretation, which views probabilities not merely as that this particular event occurred, such as deposits of extraterrestrial material that date to 65 million years accounting for subjective observational error but as ago, a crater of appropriate size and age, or any other Popper, 1959) of experimenter A's results. Here, the two experimenters examine different properties of the effect the postulated event would have had. Even the most successful probabilists in human history, insursame theoretically defined concept (the concept of the biological population). They obtain and analyze their ance companies, make the distinction between future and past events. They employ frequency-based probadata in different ways, but the two discovery operations in no way conflict with each other in terms of bilities of classes of events to establish insurance premiums, but they recognize that, despite their low probatheir background knowledge. Each operation provides evidence by measuring different properties of the same bilities, airplanes do crash, boats do sink, jewels do get stolen, and individuals under the age of 25 do die.
putative thing, and they are therefore complementary. In statistical inference this concept is expressed as comConsequently, when considering whether or not to pay a claim for any of these statistically improbable events, plementary or alternative estimators of the same parameter. insurance companies examine the evidence that the particular event occurred (e.g., sworn affidavits, hospiComplementary discovery operations do not always yield identical results, and scientists are often required tal records, photographs of wrecked cars, police reports), not the probability that it would have occurred.
to invent defensible criteria to resolve contradictions. In the fish example above, if experimenter B had found Similarly, the probability that police reports may be false is uninformative of the accuracy of the particular the fish to be highly localized, researchers may favor the results of experimenter A by proposing the ad hoc police report in question.
Multiple discovery operations proposed to discover explanation that long-range migration of individuals is not required for gene flow to occur throughout a instances of the same theoretically defined concepts may be complementary or exclusive, and the distincpopulation and that measurement of gene flow is therefore a more severe test. Or, they may favor experition must be made before their results can be interpreted defensibly. In some cases, discovery operations exmenter B's results by postulating inadequate time of separation to allow genetic divergence. More likely, amine different properties but do not build upon contradictory background knowledge (a priori empirigiven the way scientists usually proceed, they would choose to further test the hypothesis by examining cal and metaphysical knowledge claims). Contrary to classes, which are defined intentionally by a finite set additional properties, such as different molecular markers or the vagility of different age or sex classes, of properties that are necessary and sufficient for membership, individuals possess an indefinite number of or by increasing the sample size for both analyses. Regardless, it is only rational to treat the results of properties, none of which is necessary or sufficient (besides the trivial property of individuality), and any distinct discovery operations as independent corroborations or to attempt to reconcile (or even address) of which may be of use in their identification. That is, whereas individual identity is not tied to any particular contradictory results if the discovery operations are complementary. set of properties and is therefore transitive, identification is dependent on the properties examined and is In other cases, discovery operations designed to address the same problem attribute evidential signifitherefore nontransitive (and as a consequence may fail). Insofar as it is impossible to measure all the propcance to the same data (or class of data) but interpret them differently. Because both the problem and the erties of an individual, each discovery operation must focus on the subset of properties it deems evidentially data are the same, it is logically impossible for these operations to be measuring different properties of the significant. This is illustrated by Siddall and Kluge's (1997, p. 328 ) example of two experimenters, A and B, same individuals; the differences between the discovery operations lie entirely in their treatment of the data. who wish to determine if a stock of fish is part of a larger population: Experimenter A conducts genetic These discovery operations are therefore exclusive of each other (cf. Carnap, 1966, p. 238 ; Siddall and Kluge, analyses of a larger region and finds homogeneity. Experimenter B uses telemetric tagging and GPS technol-1997, p. 329). Whereas there are strong epistemological reasons to employ multiple complementary discovery ogy and finds fish migrating over a large distance coincident with the region found by experimenter A, operations in addressing any problem (the more properties of an individual that are measured, the better thereby providing independent corroboration (sensu its limits can be apprehended and the more severely discovery operations attempt to maximize (descriptive efficiency is often included as well, but, insofar as hypotheses about its existence can be tested), the results of multiple exclusive discovery operations reflect it is scientifically relevant, it reduces to explanatory power). 7 Similarly, tests of discovery operations must only the degree to which different interpretations can lead to the same or different conclusions. This phenomthemselves be based on sound premises, and the evaluation criteria they use should be defensible indicators enon may be of interest to psychologists and historians of science, but it has no bearing on the scientific probof the scientific principles discovery operations aim to implement. These considerations form the basis of the lem at hand, i.e., the apprehension of ontologically real entities and events. Scientific studies that apply following discussion.
The tests employed by evolutionary biologists to multiple exclusive discovery operations to the same data set as a test of competing hypotheses (e.g., Kim, evaluate discovery operations can be arranged into three classes, defined on the basis of the considerations 1993) have no evidentiary basis for the conclusions they draw and thus amount to nothing more than mere given evidential significance and the structure of the argumentation. Theoretical tests aim to show that a sophistry (see also Siddall and Kluge, 1997; Brower, 2000) . This is not to say that comparison of the results of discovery operation is inconsistent with accepted theory, i.e., that it is contradicted by explanatory hypotheexclusive discovery operations has no merit in science, only that there is no epistemological reason to hope ses that have been borne out by empirical observations. Empirical tests evaluate the performance of competing for identical results or need to reconcile their differences, and it does not constitute a valid test. discovery operations in terms of their results when applied to the same empirical data set. Philosophical Given the pivotal role played by discovery operations in formulating all knowledge claims, it is no wontests aim to show that an operation is inconsistent with logical and epistemological principles. der that evolutionary biologists are so obsessed with them. Rationality demands that scientists subject their discovery operations to the most rigorous tests possible
Theoretical Tests
in an attempt to ensure that they do not distort their perceptions of reality but instead sharpen their focus Theoretical tests aim to show that a discovery operation is inconsistent with previously tested, well-corroband bring real patterns to light. Discovery operations are ontologically distinct from explanatory conjectures orated, and (tentatively) accepted theory. They are best understood as a subset of the more broadly defined (laws, theories, hypotheses, models), and it follows that the tests they are subjected to should be structurclass of thought experiments. In general, thought experiments require that the consequences of some posally and procedurally different as well. tulated hypothesis, premise, or discovery operation be imagined without actually observing the events. As exemplified historically by Galileo, Newton, Einstein, "good" science have been proposed, they can be conis. Instead, scientists require that discovery operations produce theodensed into the interrelated concepts of explanatory ries that explain available observations and predict novel discoveries power and severity of test, and these are the scientific (and are thereby empirically testable), and they rationally prefer those that best achieve these goals.
TESTS OF IDEOGRAPHIC DISCOVERY
(i.e., cognitive or epistemic) principles that scientific more pragmatic fields such as economics and law. Their insofar as they are extended in time, but their unity is due also to cohesive and integrative processes, making purposes and applications are extremely diverse, and a large literature explores the ontological status, applithem contemporary individuals. In contrast, historical individuals are united only by common history, not cations, strengths, and limitations of thought experiments in different fields (see Sorensen, 1992 , for recurrent interactions. Although the argumentation differs, this species conview). For the purposes of this paper I will consider only their use as tests of discovery operations in evolucept is extremely similar to Wiley's (1978) evolutionary species concept. The main difference between them is tionary biology.
Thought experiments in evolutionary biology prothat, although the evolutionary species concept derives evidence from history and eschews the biological ceed by creating data sets or problem situations and examining the ability of competing discovery operaspecies concept's reliance on predicted ability to interbreed, the assertions that a species "maintains its tions to provide theoretically sound solutions. Often they involve only a few variables and examine a limited identity" and has a unique "historical fate" are also prospective (Wiley, 1978; Frost and Hillis, 1990 ; O'Hara, parameter space. However, as a result of the increased use of computers in biological problem solving, mod-1993; Frost, 2000; Wiley and Mayden, 2000) . Prospective definition brings with it the problematic position ern thought experiments often involve more complex, multivariate thought experiments referred to as simuthat if an individual (species) ceases to exist through introgression, then it never existed; i.e., it was never an lations. It must be noted, however, that even the most complex, sophisticated simulations differ from their individual (species). This requirement of future permanence is at odds with both the philosophical notion of more conventional congeners only in the number of variables and the range of parameters they examine.
individuality (which views individuals as temporary by definition) and biological theory. For example, in They still ask us to imagine the consequences of some postulated hypothesis or premise without empirical recent years the diversity of species of cichlid fishes in Lake Victoria has declined due (in part) to eutrophicaobservations.
Regardless of the degree of complexity or sophistication and increased turbidity, which inhibits visual distinction of con-and heterospecifics and has resulted tion, "[t]hought experiment, like concrete experiment, has evidential significance only where particular asin "extinction" by introgression (Seehausen et al., 1997; Seehausen and van Alphen, 1998; Witte et al., 2000) . sumptions . . . are taken to hold; under alternative premises, in themselves equally defensible, thought Application of the evolutionary species concept would lead to the problematic conclusion that those species experiment is evidentially inert" (McAllister, 1996, p. 233) . These tests apply accepted theoretical premises that went extinct through introgression never were species. Because Kluge's (1990) concept is concerned only to a problem in an attempt to discover the weaknesses of competing discovery operations; if those premises with whether or not an individual's unity is due to contemporaneous interactions and/or historical conare unsound, the thought experiment is not a valid test.
A number of authors (e.g., Wiley, 1978 Wiley, , 1981 ; Cracraft, nections (and not future permanence), it does not suffer from prospection. That is, what matters is whether 1983; Frost and Hillis, 1990; Frost and Kluge, 1994; Frost, 2000) have employed a theoretical test to evalusomething is a species, not whether it will always be one. Note that this definition does not prescribe any ate competing species concepts. As discussed above, a rigorous scientific research program requires that an operation by which species can be apprehended in nature. abstract, theoretical definition of the class of particulars (in this case, species) be antecedent to the formulation Having theoretically defined the class of entities to be detected, the biological species concept, BS (e.g., and testing of the discovery operations designed to detect them. As a necessary implication of the theory Mayr, 1942) , and the strictly character-based concepts collected under the phylogenetic species concept, 8 PS of descent with modification (Frost and Kluge, 1994, pp. 275, 277) , species are defined theoretically as the smallest historical individuals within which there is a (e.g., Rosen, 1978 Rosen, , 1979 Nelson and Platnick, 1981;  is based are taken to hold, and no alternative, equally Cracraft, 1983 Cracraft, , 1987 Mishler and Donoghue, 1982 ; Dodefensible premises exist. The only theoretical claims noghue, 1985; Wheeler, 1990, 1992;  Wheeler required in this test are "descent, with modification," and , can be seen as competing discovery which allow that species that are not each other's closoperations. 9 The BS relies exclusively on reproductive est relative may be reproductively compatible (an alcompatibility for species discovery, while the PS treats lowance that has been borne out empirically; e.g., character distribution as evidence. The theoretical refu- Rosen, 1979) . No further claims regarding mechanisms tation consists of a thought experiment wherein two of reproductive isolation or other evolutionary procindependent, nonreticulating lineages that are not each esses are required. Moreover, there is no counterexamother's closest relative are reproductively compatible.
ple wherein the BS would recognize independent linIn this situation, the BS would treat them as a single eages as distinct species and the PS would necessarily species regardless of recovered evidence that they are conflate them as one. Second, the evaluation criterion distinct historical individuals, whereas the PS would is clearly defensible. By obscuring lineage history, the treat them as distinct species. Therefore, the PS con-BS reduces explanatory power. forms to theory (i.e., recovers the theoretically defined Another group of thought experiments involves the entities), whereas the BS does not.
theoretical testing of discovery operations designed to This is not to say that the PS is guaranteed to recover formulate and test phylogenetic hypotheses. As in the all species without error. Both the PS and the BS may above species example, a theoretical definition of fail to detect independent lineages as a result of at least clades exists: a clade is a group composed of an ancestwo unavoidable facts: (1) it is theoretically expected tor and all its descendent lineages. Furthermore, "dethat the evolution of diagnostic characters (changes) scent, with modification" indicates that clades are a may lag behind lineage splitting (speciation) and (2) necessary result of speciation. Phylogenetic discovery even with the highly flexible (in terms of sources of operations therefore aim to discover clades. The testing evidence) PS, scientists necessarily examine only a procedure followed in these thought experiments is to small subset of the actual number of characters (any evolve imaginary phylogenies of four or more taxa of which may be indicative of character history rather according to theoretical premises ("models") and evalthan lineage history; Frost et al., 1998) , so hypotheses uate them in terms of accuracy (performance, success), of lineage identity must be reassessed as new data are statistical consistency, robustness, statistical efficiency, obtained (Wiley, 1978 (Wiley, , 1981 . However, insofar as the and power, 10 (e.g., Saitou and Nei, 1987; Sourdis and PS aims to recover evidence of evolutionary change Nei, 1988; Saitou and Imanishi, 1989; Penny et al., 1992 ; (historical separation) as opposed to reproductively Huelsenbeck and Hillis, 1993; Hillis and Bull, 1993 ; isolated groups of organisms, and therefore does not ; Tateno conflate demonstrably unrelated lineages as a single et al., 1994; Hillis, 1995; Huelsenbeck, 1995a, b; Yang, species , the PS is a better operational proxy for the Chang, 1996; Siddall, 1998 ; Pol theoretical species; it is the least refuted discovery operand Siddall, 2001 ). However, as tests, these simulations ation.
have two major shortcomings. This theoretical test is convincing and decisive for First, the theoretical premises (models) upon which two reasons. First, the premises upon which the test these tests are founded are not valid. Unlike the species example above, wherein the only assumptions were character distribution as an indicator of history, not reproductive "descent, with modification" (which apply to all life), compatibility, and therefore stand in opposition to the biological these thought experiments involve numerous assumpspecies concept.
tions about the evolutionary process, particularly 9
That they can be seen as operations does not imply that their proponents actually see them that way. Mayr, for example, has consistently asserted (e.g., Mayr, 2000) that his concept is not a mere 10 Several papers on simulation studies mention additional properoperation. However, others have interpreted these concepts operationally (e.g., Frost and Kluge, 1994; de Queiroz, 1998) , and there is ties of good phylogenetic discovery operations, such as computational speed and versatility (e.g., , but much to be gained from consciously separating the abstract concept from the discovery operation.
simulations do not address any of these criteria.
about rates and kinds of changes and their distribu-
Empirical Tests
tions across lineages and characters. Most significantly, Empirical tests are at the heart of science. However, these models make the counterfactual assumption as suggested in the first section of this paper, the empirthat nonhomologous characters (different basepairs) ical tests of explanatory hypotheses differ from those of evolved according to a common mechanism (i.e., idendiscovery operations. There are several ways in which tical stochastic process, homogeneous rate). No one discovery operations are commonly tested empirically. has attempted to simulate a case in which all characters First, limited resources and pragmatic necessity may (sites) were allowed to evolve independently (i.e., to require scientists to employ a faster, easier, cheaper, have its own suite of branch lengths; note that assumbut scientifically inferior discovery operation than ing a gamma distribution of variation among sites still would be used in other situations. Here, empirical tests imposes a common mechanism defined by the shape of the competing suboptimal discovery operations may variable, ␣ ), but Tuffley and Steel (1997) show analytibe performed to determine which one provides results cally that both parsimony and likelihood will choose that are most congruent with those of the scientifically the same tree or trees in this case and, therefore, that superior operation. For example, species discovery and the apparent superiority of likelihood in most of these delimitation are highly theoretical, observationally insimulations is nothing but an artifact of the unrealistic tensive, costly undertakings that may require large models. To paraphrase McAllister (1996) , alternative samples and extensive knowledge of the taxa in quespremises, in themselves equally (in this case, more) tion; however, a simplified dichotomous key provides defensible, exist, which renders the results of these an operation by which known species can be discovthought experiments evidentially inert (see also ered quickly and easily, with only a minimum amount Carpenter and Wheeler, 1999) .
of prior knowledge. Because they rely on only a subset The second major flaw in these tests concerns the of our knowledge about the organisms, all keys are decisiveness of their results. Even under the assumpguaranteed to fail at some level, but competing keys tion of a common mechanism, the only strong conclucan be tested by examining their ability to assign specision that emerges from these simulations is that no mens to the "correct" species (as determined by the single discovery operation is more consistent, robust, more scientifically rigorous operations) as quickly as or accurate than all others under all premises (relative possible. Insofar as the concern here is pragmatic, not branch lengths). For example, maximum likelihood scientific, and because this class of test applies only in certainly outperforms parsimony in the "Felsenstein particular cases (i.e., for a given set of taxa, not for all Zone" (wherein two nonsister branches are long and taxa) this kind of empirical test is appropriate. other branches are short), but Siddall (1998) found that However, a similar approach has been advocated as parsimony outperforms maximum likelihood in the a means of choosing scientifically optimal discovery "Farris Zone" (in which two sister branches are long operations. A phylogeny that is "well supported" (deand others are short). All these discovery operations fined as a phylogenetic hypothesis supported by two perform well in some circumstances and poorly in othor more data partitions; Allard and Miyamoto, 1992; ers (Farris, 1984 (Farris, , 1986 (Farris, , 1999 Hillis and Huelsenbeck, Miyamoto et al., 1994; Miyamoto and Fitch, 1995; Yang, 1996; Siddall, 1998) , and in nature it is Wiens, 1998 Wiens, , 2000 , "well corroborated" or "strong" impossible to know what the true relationships are, (supported by quantitative analysis; Marshall, 1992; i.e., whether empirical findings are the result of long Friedlander et al., 1996; Zardoya and Meyer, 1996 ; Cunbranch attraction in the Felsenstein Zone, long branch ningham, 1997), or "firmly established," "noncontrorepulsion in the Farris Zone (Siddall, 1998) , or some versial," "widely accepted," or "conservative" (no exother misleading phenomenon (e.g., Pol and Siddall, plicit operation or criteria employed to select the initial 2001). Consequently, these simulations serve only to hypothesis; Friedlander et al., 1994; Graybeal, 1994 ; illustrate how competing discovery operations may Russo et al., 1996; Zardoya and Meyer, 1996 ; Cunningpotentially mislead in different ways, but they do not ham, 1997; Brown, 1997, 1998 ; Ballard et provide a rational basis for choice of discovery operaal., 1998; Miya and Nishida, 2000) is designated as "known," "correct," or "expected," and competing tion (Farris, 1984 (Farris, , 1986 (Farris, , 1999 Siddall, 1998) . phylogenetic discovery operations are evaluated in this approach neglect to note that the claimed consensual agreement is fully dependent on external knowlterms of their ability to reproduce the same topology when applied to a subset of the original data or a new edge derived from some other scientifically superior discovery operation, one that considers all relevant data set. The results of the tests are then generalized to apply universally. This test strategy is flawed for at taxa and characters, not just these few. least five reasons.
(4) The results of these tests can lead to logically inconsistent conclusions. For example, Wiens (2000) (1) Most fundamentally, match with expectation is found that distance and maximum-likelihood methnot a defensible criterion for choosing a scientifically ods were most congruent with the "correct" phylogeoptimal discovery operation (cf. Carpenter and nies inferred previously through parsimony analysis. Wheeler, 1999; Wenzel and Siddall, 1999) . If the task This result leads to the illogical conclusion that differof science is to maximally test empirical hypotheses, ent characters should be interpreted with different then the rational justification of scientific discovery phylogenetic discovery operations or, worse, that the operations must not hinge on the veracity of the original data also should have been analyzed with hypotheses they are designed to test; to do so is these methods and not parsimony, which means that circular and verificationist. As stated succinctly by the well-supported parsimony phylogenies upon Carpenter and Wheeler (1999, p. 255), "[h] ypotheses which the conclusion is based should not have been cannot be tested by treating them as criteria." used in the first place, and thus invalidates the test. (2) In particular, there is no valid scientific reason (5) The results of particular tests logically cannot to treat taxonomic congruence as an optimality critebe generalized. Because of the extensive variation rion, and many reasons not to (Kluge, 1989 (Kluge, , 1998  inherent in the biological system, the observation Eernisse and Kluge, 1993; Kluge and Wolf, 1993;  that a discovery operation gives results that conform Jones et al., 1993; Nixon and Carpenter, 1996; Wenzel, with the correct phylogeny in a particular instance 1997; Carpenter and Wheeler, 1999; O'Leary, 1999) .
does not provide any assurance that the same will Therefore, there is no basis for employing congruoccur in other instances. Even closely related lineages ence with these well-supported phylogenies as an may have evolved according to very different procevaluation criterion, and there is certainly no justifiesses (e.g., Siddall and Kluge, 1997) . Therefore, this cation for using a hypothesis derived from a nontest can be employed with any confidence only if the quantitative analysis with no specified optimality question of phylogenetic relationships has already criterion for this purpose! been answered "satisfactorily," making this a scientifically sterile procedure. (3) Beyond the epistemological pitfalls associated with this practice, the actual identification of noncontroversial hypotheses is extremely problematic, as Evolutionary biologists have also tested discovery operations empirically with criteria other than conexemplified by the relationships of artiodactyls and cetaceans. Citing Gatesy et al. (1999) , Hillis (1999, p. gruence with a "known" phylogeny. For example, Wiens (1995) used number of most-parsimonious trees, 9979) characterizes these relationships as "virtually known" and therefore appropriate for testing the number of informative characters, phylogenetic signal (g l index), bootstrap value, and sensitivity to reduced accuracy of a new source of characters, while other authors consider them to be "by no means clear" sample size as criteria to determine which method of treating polymorphic characters in phylogenetic analy- (Nikaido et al., 1999, p. 10261; see also O'Leary, 1999; O'Leary and Geisler, 1999) . It seems that the only sis is optimal. Similarly, level of homoplasy, number of most-parsimonious roots, amount of resolution, and way to avoid such controversy is to select carefully only a few, distantly related taxa (as did Friedlander number of most-parsimonious trees were used to evaluate competing character polarization operations for et Graybeal, 1994; Russo et al., 1996; Zardoya and Meyer, 1996; Brown, 1997, 1998;  phylogenetic analysis (Kraus, 1988; Meier, 1997) . And more recently Bjö rklund (1999) Miya and Nishida, 2000) . However, proponents of tested whether or not third positions should be innot conclusively identify one of the discovery operations as scientifically optimal, but the source of this cluded in phylogenetic analyses by looking at number of most parsimonious trees, consistency, retention, and frustration is their recognition of, and refusal to go beyond, the logical limits of empirical observation as it total support indices, average Bremer support, number of resolved nodes, g l index, randomization test, PTP, bears upon choice of scientifically optimal ideographic discovery operations.
11 bootstrap, and jackknife. However, these evaluation criteria are not sufficient to defensibly select one disAn interesting attempt to circumvent the limits of empirical tests of ideographic discovery operations covery operation over another because they are unrelated to the scientific principles of explanatory power and avoid the "gross simplifications" and "sweeping generalizations" that simulations (thought experiand severity of test. If, as implied by these tests, the ments) necessarily invoke (Hillis and Huelsenbeck, optimality criteria of phylogenetic inference were in 1994, pp. 55-56) involves the generation of experimenfact to minimize the number of most parsimonious tal (known) phylogenies (e.g., Hillis et al., 1992 Hillis et al., , 1993 Hillis et al., , trees and maximize support and resolution (rather than 1994 ; to maximize explanatory power and severity of test Crandall, 1994; Cunningham et al., 1998) . In these studby minimizing ad hoc hypotheses of homoplasy in light ies, a laboratory colony of the bacteriophage T7 mainof all available character evidence), systematists could tained in the presence of a mutagen was periodically simply discard evidence until they obtain a single soludivided to generate a known phylogeny. Phylogenetic tion with a consistency index of 1.0. Alternatively, they methods were then evaluated in terms of their ability could disregard empirical observation altogether and to recover the correct phylogeny. However, concrete employ a sophisticated method of randomly choosing experiments are subject to the same constraints as or generating a single, fully resolved solution. That thought experiments in that they only have evidential such operations are nonsensical is clear. Simply put, significance where particular assumptions (premises) to choose evidence on the basis of the results it provides are taken to hold (cf. McAllister, 1996) . Therefore, in is circular and unacceptable in science. Sources of eviorder for the studies of experimental phylogenies to dence (potential falsifiers) must be identified based on represent general tests of the operations they examtheoretical and epistemological criteria that are exterined, it would still be necessary to assume that the nal to the analysis at hand. Insofar as the concern here evolutionary process that the experimental bacteriois strictly scientific, this kind of empirical test of ideophage T7 lineages underwent is universally applicable. graphic discovery operations cannot be justified.
Such a claim seems difficult to defend, given that, in Contrast those studies with the approach followed nature, selective pressures change over time and space, by Morrone and Carpenter (1994) , wherein 10 empiripopulation sizes increase and shrink, gene flow fluccal data sets were used merely to compare-not testtuates, and internal biological processes vary greatly, different biogeographic discovery operations. Alall of which occur over vast amounts of time to result in though empirical tests are incapable of evaluating the the observed diversity of lineages whose relationships scientific merits of ideographic discovery operations, systematists seek to reconstruct and none of which empirical comparisons can be extremely effective in could be imposed upon the bacteriophage T7 lineages stimulating progress in science. Scientists are, for the evolved under laboratory conditions over a short time most part, highly pragmatic, and if multiple methods span. Although these experimental phylogenies are yield the same answer, there is no controversy and very likely much more complex than any computer they move on to the next problem. It is therefore often simulation, they still fail to provide a general empirical necessary to demonstrate empirically how and why different operations render different results in order to stimulate the critical debate necessary for scientific test of the competing ideographic discovery operaof the inability to recognize "sameness," not of some evolutionary trend or historical law (see also Kluge, tions. 12 (See Lewontin, 2000 , for discussion of similar problems with other uses of "model organisms" in 2000, 2002) . Yet these incongruent synapomorphies are not merely discarded, as they are in clique and other evolutionary biology.) instrumentalist approaches, but rather are provided a realist account through ad hoc evolutionary explana-
Philosophical Tests
tions of independent origins (which are themselves testable through character reassessment, i.e., reciprocal Despite their lack of formal training in philosophy, illumination). Tests are imbedded in an evolutionary evolutionary biologists have a long history of using context (e.g., terms such as homoplasy and homology philosophical principles to test their ideographic disare used evolutionarily), which provides the theoretical covery operations. Philosophical tests use logical and framework necessary to evaluate discovery operations epistemological arguments to uncover the weaknesses not only in terms of their descriptive efficiency and of competing discovery operations. That is, they may internal logical consistency but also their explanatory employ formal (i.e., first-order predicate logic) or inforpower (Farris, 1982) . The claims of special knowledge mal arguments to show that an operation is logically and deterministic assumptions of probabilistic models internally or externally inconsistent and therefore canare rejected as both counterfactual and irrelevant to not be defended or justified rationally.
the study of phylogeny. Farris' tests are convincing One of the most clear-cut examples of a philosophical and decisive because the philosophical evaluation critest (or group of tests) is Farris' (1984) , The Logical Basis teria are valid, i.e., no alternative, equally defensible of Phylogenetic Analysis. In that paper, Farris considers premises exist. In short, the philosophy is sound and a variety of competing phylogenetic discovery operaso are the tests. tions and evaluates them in terms of a rigorous, hypoOf course, not all philosophical tests are valid. thetico-deductive, falsificationist epistemology. For exBrower's (2000) recent attempt to resurrect an extremist ample, the falsificationist premises of minimizing ad version of pattern cladistics on philosophical grounds hoc hypotheses and preferring the least refuted hypothamounts to nothing more than a repetition of the trivial esis in light of all available evidence are employed observation that the operation of cladistics can be perto evaluate cladistics (phylogenetic parsimony) and formed in the absence of a theoretical framework-as competing operations. Farris's explication of homocan any operation. However, the rational preference of plasy as ad hoc explanation of incongruent synapomorcladistics as the scientifically optimal phylogenetic disphies provides the epistemological basis for preferring covery operation requires reference to theory. An exthe cladogram that requires the fewest steps while also haustive critique of Brower's arguments is unwartreating incongruent synapomorphies as both erroneous ranted here, but a few examples merit attention (see and real. That is, they are explicitly treated as erroneous Kluge, 2001 , for further discussion). Although Brower hypotheses of homology (Farris, 1984, p. 676)-which admits that observation relies on theory, he paradoxirecognizes the necessary uniqueness of each transforcally does not see that discovery is impossible in the mation and, consequently, that the discovery of multiabsence of theory (hence the rejection of tabula rasa ple origins of the "same" feature can be reflective only inductivism; e.g., Popper, 1989) and that explanationand therefore explanatory power-cannot be achieved among a set of inanimate objects can be quantified and empirical tests may be used to choose the pragmatically optimal operation, but empirical tests provide no in terms of edit cost, but the results are meaningless scientifically unless the costs are associated with some evidence on the scientific merits of competing discovery operations. physical mechanism of change. Further, Brower's (see also Platnick, 1979) arguments for a metaphysical prinThe actual testing of discovery operations is a complex and intensive process that involves attacks from ciple ("epistemological axiom") of hierarchy, aside from being antiscientific-aiming to replace an empiriall angles. In practice, evolutionary biologists use combinations of tests to evaluate and choose among comcally testable theory with a metaphysical principle, which is equivalent to rejecting gene theory in favor peting discovery operations, which is as it should be. For example, Siddall and Kluge (1997) tested the theoof Darwin's "sexual elements" (note that this runs counter to Popper's view that progress is made, in retical and philosophical underpinnings of competing phylogenetic discovery operations. Later, Siddall and part, by transforming metaphysical propositions into empirically testable, scientific hypotheses; see Popper, Kluge (2000) applied different phylogenetic discovery operations (parsimony and maximum likelihood) to 1983a, b)-are pragmatically useless, as his evolutionfree axiom system fails to justify the use of characters the same contrived data sets and evaluated the results in terms of logical and epistemological principles, (which Brower does not define explicitly) to infer a hierarchy, instead of geographic distribution, ecologithereby mixing theoretical tests (thought experiments) and philosophical tests. Farris (1990) did the same to cal affinities, principle components, aesthetics, alphabetical order, or any other property. Such arguments evaluate methods of coding continuous characters for phylogenetic analysis. Kluge (2002) explicitly set out are naive, and they do not form the basis of a valid philosophical test.
to test the logical and theoretical assumptions of operations designed to detect instances of adaptation. The number and diversity of discovery operations scientists can invent is constrained only by the creativity of
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
their imaginations; scientists must therefore strive also to invent the most rigorous tests possible to evaluate competing discovery operations and employ only those that are scientifically optimal. Sound discovery operations are essential for the growth of scientific knowledge, and it is therefore imperative that discovery operations be subjected to the severest battery of tests possible. In designing those ACKNOWLEDGMENTS tests, scientists must ensure that they employ defensible and decisive indicators of the scientific strength of clear and decisive in the particular cases examined, cannot be applied generally. Appropriately designed theoretical and philosophical tests evaluate the as-
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